Since 28 February 2026, the war between Iran and the US-Israeli coalition has turned the Strait of Hormuz into the nerve centre of the world economy. With Brent near 100 dollars, a collapsed truce and 40% of exports rerouted, every power reads the conflict through its own interests. A multi-voice analysis.
Introduction
The war that broke out on 28 February 2026 between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other has not stayed a regional conflict. By striking the heart of Iran's military and nuclear apparatus, the coalition triggered an asymmetric response whose main weapon is not a missile but a geography: the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world's oil transits.
The partial closure of this passage turned a war into a planet-wide energy shock. The International Energy Agency called it the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market. But behind the numbers, the conflict is also a revealer: each power reads it through its own fears and its own calculations. It is this plurality of viewpoints that must be understood to grasp the real stakes.
The Numbers of the Shock
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Oil through Hormuz | ~21 M b/d |
| Brent, 6 October | ~99 $ |
| Exports bypassing Hormuz | ~40 % |
| Start of the war | 28 Feb. 2026 |
| Share of world crude via Hormuz | ~20 % |
The Viewpoints: Six Readings of One War
Tehran: regime survival and the weapon of the strait
For the Islamic Republic, the war is existential. Deprived of part of its nuclear and military capabilities, it is betting on its one decisive lever: the ability to make Hormuz impassable. By threatening global energy trade, Tehran seeks to convert its military vulnerability into economic nuisance power, and to trade any reopening against a lifting of sanctions and reparations. The announced maritime exclusion zone is less a naval measure than a political message.
Washington and Tel Aviv: decapitate and reopen
For the coalition, the stated objective is twofold: to durably neutralise Iran's nuclear programme and to restore freedom of navigation. Strikes on energy infrastructure and on tankers tied to the Revolutionary Guards aim to choke Iran's ability to fund the war. But Washington faces a contradiction: every escalation that deprives Iran of revenue also pushes prices up, feeding inflation among allies and the domestic political opposition alike.
The Gulf monarchies: the fear of being trapped
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha live the conflict in anxiety. Their oil and gas facilities are within missile range, and a long war threatens their diversification projects. They attempt a balancing act: discreet support for the coalition, channels of dialogue with Tehran, and an acceleration of bypass routes, pipelines and terminals outside the strait, to reduce their dependence on the Hormuz chokepoint.
Beijing and Moscow: cut-price oil and a bogged-down America
China, the leading buyer of Iranian crude, views the conflict with ambivalence: the price rise weighs on its economy, but the weakening of American influence and access to discounted Iranian oil serve its interests. Moscow, an exporter, mechanically profits from the surge in prices. For both capitals, an America once again absorbed by the Middle East is a strategic windfall that diverts its attention from the Indo-Pacific and from Ukraine.
Europe and importing Asia: the collateral victims
The European Union and the big Asian importers, Japan and South Korea foremost, suffer the shock with no military lever. The spike in crude, the disruption of LNG deliveries and the rise in urea-based fertilisers hit their industry and their purchasing power. For them, the priority is not the victory of one camp but a rapid end to the disruption, which pushes them towards a diplomacy of de-escalation that is often powerless.
The Global South and India: the bill before the principles
For India, a major importer, and for many countries of the Global South, the war is measured first in the energy and food bill. New Delhi, which buys both Russian crude and Gulf hydrocarbons, refuses to pick a side and pleads for stability of supply. The conflict reinforces a long-held conviction in these capitals: great-power wars are paid for first at the counter of the poorest.
The Oil Shock in Numbers
The mechanics are brutal. With roughly 21 million barrels a day normally transiting Hormuz, any obstruction is instantly reflected in prices. Brent, long below 80 dollars, crossed and then oscillated around 100 dollars. About 40% of exports are now rerouted outside the strait, through ship-to-ship transfers offshore or along saturated land routes, at considerable logistical and insurance cost.
The effect reaches beyond oil: LNG, part of which transits the same zone, and nitrogen fertilisers see their prices soar, threatening the following year's harvests. Imported inflation, barely tamed after the previous crises, picks up again, forcing central banks into a dilemma between supporting growth and fighting rising prices.
DEBATE: A short, decisive war, or a stalemate that redraws the energy order?
The military balance of power will impose a swift end The coalition's air and naval superiority is overwhelming, Iranian capabilities are eroding, and the economic pressure on Tehran is untenable in the long run. A bled-dry Iran will end up negotiating, Hormuz will reopen, and prices will recede. The shock, however violent, would then be an episode, not a tipping point.
Asymmetry favours stalemate and recomposition Iran does not need to win, only to keep the strait uncertain. A few attacks are enough to maintain a high risk premium. The longer the war lasts, the more buyers build durable bypass routes, the more China and Russia consolidate their positions, and the more the energy order tilts towards a fragmented and expensive world.
The truth lies in duration. A swift military victory is possible but does not guarantee a stable peace as long as the political causes remain. The most likely outcome is neither capitulation nor total war, but a prolonged instability that, through bypasses and realignments, will leave an oil market that is more expensive, more fragmented and less dependent on a single strait. The Iran war will then have designated a winner less than it redrew a map.
TIMELINE
28 February 2026: Start of the war between Iran and the US-Israeli coalition, strikes on military and nuclear sites.
27 March 2026: The IRGC announces the closure of Hormuz to ships tied to the United States, Israel and their allies.
April 2026: A brief two-week window of secured passage; Iran conditions any reopening on a lifting of sanctions and on reparations.
13 April to 29 May 2026: American blockade of Iranian ports, worsening the supply disruption.
Mid-August 2026: The sixty-day truce expires without renewal; fighting resumes.
September and October 2026: American strikes on Larak island, Iranian attacks on bases in Jordan, strikes on tankers tied to the IRGC; Brent around 100 dollars.
SCENARIOS 2026-2032
Scenario 1: Negotiated de-escalation (probability: 35%) An agreement, brokered by Gulf or Asian mediators, reopens Hormuz in exchange for a partial easing of sanctions; prices recede towards 70 to 80 dollars within a year.
Scenario 2: Prolonged instability (probability: 45%) Neither peace nor total war: intermittent attacks, a lasting risk premium, the generalisation of bypass routes, crude durably above 90 dollars.
Scenario 3: Regional escalation (probability: 20%) The conflict spreads to the Gulf, hits Saudi or Emirati facilities, and causes a spike beyond 120 dollars with imported recession in the most dependent countries.
ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION
The Iran war of 2026 will be remembered as the moment a regional crisis reminded the world of its dependence on a few dozen kilometres of sea. But its deepest lesson lies elsewhere: a single event does not have one meaning, it has as many as there are actors. For Tehran, it is a war of survival; for Washington, a disarmament operation; for the Gulf, a trap; for Beijing and Moscow, an opportunity; for Europe and importing Asia, a bill; for the Global South, one more injustice. To understand this conflict is not to decide who is right, it is to hold these contradictory readings together. For it is from their collision, far more than from the strikes themselves, that the energy and strategic order of the coming years will emerge.
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